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BANKXS AND BANxiNG-"LNE oF CREDIT" CONTRACTs-SPEcrAL DAMAGES FOR
BREAcH BY BANE:.The plaintiff bank agreed with the. defendants, prospective
investors in a corporation, that it would make advances up to $25,ooo to the cor-
poration when organized. In reliance on this agreement, the defendants sub-
scribed for stock, deposited $5,oo for the corporation in the bank, and launched
the enterprise. The bank refused to give credit in the absence of a personal
guaranty from the defendants. Having obtained it, they advanced $14,ooo, and
then refused to continue. Upon the corporation's insolvency the bank realized
all it could from the assets, and then sued the defendants on their guaranty.
The defendants pleaded affirmatively the bank's breach of the contract to loan
without the guaranty, and set up damages, greater than those asked by the plain-
tiff, based on the loss of prospective profits. Held, that the plaintiff's complaint
should be dismissed. Merchants' Bank of Canada v. Sims (I922, Wash.) 2o9
Pac. 1113.
Agreements to lend money are generally not specifically enforceable on the
ground that there is no mutuality of remedy. See (1918) 27 YALE LAW JoURNAL,
1083; (1918) 18 CoL L. REv. 491. And where the action is at law, unless
special damages are proved, the recovery will be limited to the difference
between the contract interest rate and the prevailing market rate. Coles v.
Lumber Co. (19o9) 15o N. C. 183, 63 S. E. 736, L. R. A. 1916 F, 5o6, note;
29 L. R. A. (r. s.) 194, note. Bank "line of credit" agreements are themselves
a recent and rapidly developing special class of such contracts devised to attract
or promote business. They may take the form of offers by a bank to extend a
"line of credit" to the offeree provided that he keep average deposits of 2o% of
the amount of the promised advances; or they ma;, consist of promises to loan
which so induce the promisee to make commitments in reliance as to give the
making of such commitments the character of both acceptance and consideration.
Whether or not there is a binding contract depends upon the facts of a parti-
cular case. Farabee-Treadwell Co. v. Union and Planter's Bank (1916) 135
Tenn. 208, 186 S. W. 92; Murphy v. Hanna (1917) 37 N. D. 156, 164 N. W. 32(advances by an individual) ; contra: Swindell & Co. v. First Nat. Bank (19o5)
121 Ga. 714, 49 S. E. 673. In the instant case such a contract existed. The con-
sequences of finding such a contract are important only when lost profits are
recoverable as special damages for the breach. Cf. Murphy v. Hanna, supra;
Pugh v. Jackson (1913) 154 Ky. 649, 157 S. W. 1O82. Theoretically the loss of
profits contemplated by the parties, if a proximate result of the breach, are recov-
erable, yet in practice such profits are generally held to be speculative and remote,
difficult or incapable of proof. Allied Silk Mfrs. v. Erstein (1915) 168 App.
Div. 283, 153 N. Y. Supp. 976; aff'd. (1921) 195 App. Div. 366, 186 N. Y. Supp.
295. But this objection is being undermined in other types of contracts. Shelly
v. Eccles (1922, C. C. A. 8th) 283 Fed. 361 (damages allowed for contemplated
advance in the price of sugar-cane land due to the erection of an adjoining
refinery). And perhaps it is the same tendency which now permits the recovery
of "gains prevented" or "losses incurred" in suits on contracts to loan money,
since in such cases it is contemplated that the customer shall make commitments
which he cannot fulfill without the capital promised by the bank. Holt v.
United Security Co. (19o9) 76 N. J. L. 585, 72 Atl. 301; Norris Lumber Co. v.
Harris (I91, Tex. Civ. App.) 177 S. W. 515. Perhaps the line of division
explaining conflicting cases which announce the preceding principle may be
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between contracts where the business has been carried on long enough to make
an adequate basis for calculation of future profits, and those where it has not.
The application of this rule of special damages to the "line of credit" contract
is logical, although unwelcome to bankers. Cf. (I918) 18 COL. L. REv. 170.
CARRIERS-LIITATION OF LIABILiTY-INTERPRETATIoN OF THE SECOND CUMMINS
AMENDMENT.-The defendant express company published a schedule of rates
based upon an agreed valuation of goods shipped, and filed it with the Interstate
Commerce Commission. The plaintiff shipped goods at the lower rate but did
not sign the receipt, which stipulated that the rate paid was based upon an agreed
valuation. The plaintiff sued for the full value of the goods which were dam-
aged in transit. Held, that recovery was limited to the agreed valuation.
American Ry. Express Co. v. Lindenburg (1923, U. S.) 43 Sup. Ct. 206.
The efforts of carriers to avoid their strict common-law liability met with
varying success in the various ,jurisdictions resulting in much confusion.
Southern Pacific Co. v. Crenshaw (igog) 5 Ga. App. 675, 63 S. E. 865; see
(1917) 26 YAr LAW JOtRNAL, 611; (1922) 32 ibid. 85. The Carmack Amend-
ment, Act of June 29, i9o6 (34 Stat. at L. 584, 595) to the Interstate Commerce
Act brought all contracts for interstate shipments under one federal law, permit-
ting the carrier to limit the amount recoverable to an agreed valuation where
the shipper had chosen a lower or "released" rate. Adams Express Co. v.
Crominger (1913) 226 U. S. 491, 33 Sup. Ct 148; Pierce Co. v. Wells Fargo &
Co. (1915) 236 U. S. 278, 35 Sup. Ct. 351. The latter decision was severely
criticized. NoTE AND COMMENT (19,5) 13 MIcH. L. REV. 59o. Almost immedi-
ately thereafter Congress passed the first Cummins Amendment, Act of March
4, 1915 (38 Stat. at L. 1196), making the carrier liable irrespective of any device
tending to limit liability. This in turn was followed by the second Cummins
Amendment, Act of August 9, 1916 (39 Stat. at L. 44I), interpreted by the
Supreme Court for the first time in the instant case. According to its terms
the provisions of the first Amendment do not apply to property concerning which
the carrier is "expressly authorized" by the Interstate Commerce Commission
to maintain rates "dependent upon the value declared in writing by the shipper
or agreed upon in writing as the released value of the property." In the instant
case the tariff of the defendant company filed with the commission was in con-
formity with released rate schedules, authorized by the Commission for certain
other express companies. The'Court presumed such filing to be evidence of due
authority, although there was no authorization expressly given to the defendant.
The Court also held that a shipper was bound by mere acceptance of a bill
of lading, even though he had not signed it, basing its decision upon a recent
report of the Commission. It the Matter of Bills of Lading (1919) 52 I. C. C.
Rep. 671, 681. The decision apparently restores the Carmack Amendment, and
in effect repeals the first Cummins Amendment in so far as it relates to released
rates. The chief objection to the former law, namely, that the differential
between rates limiting and those not limiting the carrier's liability far exceeds
the additional insurance risk to the carrier, is removed by the approval of the
Commission to the presently existing released rate schedules. The effect of this
decision is to educate the shipper on the operation of released rates by sad
experience. If the rates for the higher* valuations are unfair, shippers may
combine to petition the Commission to act-in that regard.
CRIMINAL LAW-HOmIclDE COMMITTED IN THE COURSE OF A CONSPIRACY.-
Five men conspired to rob a bank. After being discovered one of them, in order
to make his escape, shot and killed a pursuer. The trial court charged that if
the attempted escape was part of a common plan that involved shooting if
necessary anyone who might attempt to prevent such plan, all would be equally
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guilty with the one who did the killing. Held, that this instruction was correct.
Burns v. State (1922, Ind.) 136 N. E. 857.
Even unintentional homicide committed in the perpetration of a felony is
murder. People v. Sullivan (1903) 173 N. Y. i22, 65 N. E. 989; 63 L. R. A.
353, note; (ig) 36 I-ARv. L. Rv. 222. Where the homicide is committed by
one conspirator in the course of the conspiracy, all the co-conspirators are equally
liable provided the killing is a natural and probable consequence of the con-
spiracy. Powers v. Commonwealth (19o2) 114 Ky. 237, 70 S. W. 644 (intimida-
tion of legislature) ; State v. Doty (1g16) 94 Ohio St. 258, 113 N. E. 811 (vio-
lence to compel cessation of work) ; Matthews v. State (i918) i6 Ala. App. 514,
79 So. 507 (use of gun to compel submission); People v. Andrae (i92o) 295
Ill. 445, 129 N. E. 178 (burglary); State v. Roselli (192i) io9 Kan. 33, 198
Pac. 195 (robbery). On the other hand, merely being a party to the agreement
does not make the conspirator liable for the homicide of his confederate where
the conspiracy entails no probability of danger to human life. Lamb v. People
(i88o) 96 Ill. 73 (disposition of stolen goods) ; State v. Furney (889) 41 Kan.
115, 21 Pac. 213 (assault) ; People v. Koharsky (1913) 177 Mich. 194, i42 N. W.
io97 (whipping). If the killing was a natural and probable consequence, it is
no defense for the co-conspirators to show that the homicide was not intended
or contemplated, or even that it was expressly forbidden. People v. Vasquez
(875) 49 Calif. 56o; People v. Lawrence (19o4) 143 Calif. 148, 76 Pac. 893;
Henry v. State (I922) i5i Ark. 620, 237 S. W. 454. But the homicide must
have been committed in attempted furtherance of the common design. People v.
Garippo (1920) 292 Ill. 293, 127 N. E. 75. Responsibility does, however, extend
to collateral acts growing out of the common design, including acts done for the
purpose of escaping detection or arrest. McMahon v. People (igoi) i89 Ill. =,
59 N. E. 584; Romero v. State (1917) ioi Neb. 65o, 164 N. W. 554. But where
the conspiracy did not include a plan for escape, liability for the acts of co-con-
spirators ceases with the completion or abandoment of the crime. People v.
Marwig (1919) 227 N. Y. 382, 125 N. E. 535. The instant case states the law
correctly.
DAMAGES-CONVERSION OF BANK BooK.-The plaintiff deposited a bank book
with the defendant as collateral security on a note which he had indorsed. At
maturity he refused to indorse a renewal of the note, demanding a return of his
bank book. The defendant refused, whereupon the plaintiff sued in trover and
recovered fifteen cents damages. Held, that the plaintiff should recover the
full value of the deposit plus interest from the time of conversion. Stebbins v.
North Adams Trust Co. (1922, Mass.) 136 N. E. 88o.
It is well settled that for the conversion of a negotiable instrument, the
measure of damages is prima facie its face value. Revert v. Hesse (i92o) 184
Calif. 295, 193 Pac. 943; Peerless Fire Ins. Co. v. Barcus (I92i, Tex. Civ. App.)
227 S. W. 368. But in the case of a non-fiegotiable evidence of debt, such as a
bank book, the courts have had some difficulty. On the one hand it has been held
that the measure of damages is the actual damage suffered, and not the face
value of the deposit. Newman v. Munk (1901, City Ct.) 36 Misc. 639, 74 N. Y.
Supp. 467. This is on the ground that since the owner does not by the conver-
sion of the book lose-the right to his deposit, he should not recover its value.
On the other hand is what seems to be the sounder view, namely that the full
value of the deposit may be recovered. Wegner v. Second Ward Savings Bank
(i89o) 76 Wis. 242, 44 N. W. IO96. According to this, although the depositor
still retains the right evidenced by the book, by the conversion he also gets a
power, as in other cases of conversion, to transfer it to the converter even
against the latter's will, and to create in himself a right against the converter
for its value. This, the view of the instant case, is supported by cases of other
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non-negotiable instruments. Hetrick v. Smith (1912) 67 Wash. 664, 122 Pac.
363 (account-book); Stafford v. Lang (1903) 25 R. I. 488, 56 Atl. 684; Mut.
Ins. Co. v. Allen (1904) 212 Ili. 134, 72 N. E. 200 (insurance policies) ; Canadian
Bank v. McCrea (1882) io6 Ill. 281 (warehouse receipt) ;, Ryan v. Young (1906)
147 Ala. 660, 41 So. 954 (mortgage). Nor does the result seem unfair. The
plaintiff in the instant case might, it is true, by filing an indemnity bond have
compelled the bank to pay him the deposit. 3 Michie, Banks & Banking (1913)
2221 But by holding the converter personally liable for the full amount, the
burden of collecting from the bank is placed on the wrongdoer, and a certainty
of penalty is assured which is not only just, but which should more effectually
serve to deter similar wrongdoers in the future. Cf. (192o) 29 YAIx LAw
JouRxAL, 689.
EQUITY-REscissioN OF INSTRUMENTS-MISTAKE OF LAw.-A died intestate.
B and C, his two children, believing that D, the widow, was entitled as dower
to a third of the real estate in fee and not merely a life interest as the statute
provided (Ill. Rev. Sts. 1921, ch. 41, sec. I), agreed with D to divide the land
in three equal portions, each taking title to one portion in fee. Quit claim deeds
to this effect were executed and delivered. Subsequently B and C learned of
their error, and sought rescission of the deeds so that the law of inheritance
might control. Held, that the mistake being one of law, the relief should be
denied. Holbrook v. Tomlinson (1922) 304 Ill. 579, 136 N. E. 745.
The distinction between mistake of fact and mistake of law is not readily
appreciable, and originally none was made whether relief was sought at law,'
upon principles of quasi-contract, or in equity. Simpson v. Vaughan (1739, Ch.)
2 Atk. 31; Hewer v. Bartholomew (598, Q. B.) Cro. Eliz. 614; Woodward,
Quasi-Contracts (1913) secs. 35, 36. In the nineteenth century, owing to a
misapprehension of the doctrine "Ignorantia juris non excusat" relief was denied
for mistake of law both at law and in equity. Bilbie v. Lumley (18o2, K. B.)
2 East, 469; Currie v. Goold (1817, Ch.) 2 Madd. 163. And the doctrine still
persists. Scott v. Ford (19o4) 45 Or. 531, 78 Pac. 742; Halloway v. Ward
(1922) 84 Okla. 247, 203 Pac. 217; contra: Scott v. Board of Trustees (19o9)
132 Ky. 616, 116 S. W. 788; Park Bros. v. Blodgett & Clapp (1894) 64 Conn.
28, 29 AtI. 133. In a few jurisdictions the distinction between mistake of law
and mistake of fact has been abolished by statute. Woodward, op. cit. sec. 39.
Where it still remains,, numerous exceptions have, however, grown up around
mistake of law. NoTEs (1922) 22 COL. L. REv. 166;, NOTES (1918) 32 HARv. L.
REv. 283. Among the more noteworthy situations in which redress may be had
are the following: (I) a mutual mistake as to the legal effect of a document.
Canedy v. Marcy (1859, Mass.) 13 Gray, 373; contra: Fowler v. Black (1891)
136 Ill. 363, 26 N. E. 596. (2) A mistake as to private right, where in equity
and often in quasi-contract courts grant relief. Cooper v. Phibbs (1867) L. R.
2 H. L. 149; Love v. Phillips (1922, Utah) 2o8 Pac. 882; Varnum v. Town of
Highgate (1892) 65 Vt. 416, 26 Atl. 628. (3) A unilateral mistake of law with
knowledge thereof or fraudulent concealment on the part of the other party.
Hudson v. Ins. Co. (1916) 218 N. Y. 133, 112 N. E. 728. Even an innocent
misrepresentation of law has been held sufficient to afford relief. Ryon v.
Wanamaker (1921, Sup. Ct.) 116 Misc. 91, 19o N. Y. Supp. 250. (4) Mistake
as to the law of a foreign state is considered a mistake of fact. Haven v. Foster
(1829, Mass.) 9 Pick. 112. In England to-day there is little left of the rule, at
least so far as concerns relief of an equitable nature. Daniell v. Sinclair (1881)
L. R. 6 A. C. 181; Beauchamp v. Winn (1873) L. R. 6 H. L. 223. Of course in
order to have reformation there must have been a definite oral bargain to which
the written agreement or conveyance may now be made to conform. Hunt v.
Rounnaniere (1828, U. S.) I Pet. I. And as for rescission, it must be possible
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to put the parties in statu quo. Empire Gas Co. v. Higgins Oil Co. (1922, C. C.
A. 5th) 279 Fed. 977. And in either case intervening rights of bona fide pur-
chasers will prevent relief. Cole v. Fickett (igoi) 95 Me. 265, 49 Ati. io66; 2
Ames, Cases on Equity Jurisdiction (19o4) 181, note I. For the degree of proof
required to establish the mistake, see Ames, op. cit. 312, note 2. In the instant
case there was nothing on which to base reformation; but, as the parties
could be put in statu quo, if it had not been for the fact that the evidence of
the mistake fell below the required standard, the decision might well have been
brought within the exception of a mistake as to private right. Cooper v. Phibbs,
supra; Love v. Phillips, supra.
JURIES-SETTING ASIDE VERDICT BECAUSE OF AFFIDAVITS SHOWING MISTA.-
The plaintiff sued on a note for some $445. The defendant admitted the execu-
tion of the note, but set up a counterclaim. The jury returned a verdict of
$25o for the defendant. The plaintiff moved for a new trial and filed affidavits
of jurors which stated that it was the intention of the jury merely to reduce the
plaintiff's claim against the defendant in the amount of $25o. Held, (one judge
dissenting) that the jurors could not impeach their verdict. Long v. Cassiero
(1922) IO5 Ohio St. 123, 136 N. E. 888.
The affidavits of jurors which are offered to set aside a verdict may be
divided into three classes. First, those which concern the jurors' subjective
state of mind, as where the affidavits disclosed that the jurors misunderstood the
charge of the court, or made some mistake concerning the evidence. These
affidavits are not accepted. Beaubien v. Detroit United Ry. (1921) 216 Mich.
391, 185 N. W. 855; Valentine v. Pollak (1920) 95 Conn. 556, III Atl. 869. It
has been suggested that acceptance of them would be a violation of the parol
evidence rule. The verdict of a jury is a written act, like a will or a contract
or a judgment reduced to writing, and the negotiations and motives preceding
and leading up to the final act of uttering the verdict are immaterial. 4 Wig-
more, Evidence (igo5) sec. 2345; but see Hinton, Cases on Evidence (ii)
2o8, note. Furthermore, to admit them would be contrary to public policy, since
it would tempt unsuccessful parties to tamper with juries. Second, those affi-
davits which concern objective conduct of the jurors, such as offer to show
misconduct while in the jury room. These also, are not received for the same
reasons. Beaubien v. Detroit United Ry., supra; Valentine v. Pollak, supra.
But if the alleged misconduct took place outside the jury room they are received
by many courts. United States v. Ogden (19oo, D. Pa.) 1O5 Fed. 371; contra:
Wyckoff v. Chicago City Ry. (9o) 234 Ill. 613, 85 N. E. 237. Third, affidavits
of jurors which state that the writing handed to the court, or the verdict
reported, is not their true verdict. Such a case arose where through a clerical
error the verdict returned did not represent the conclusion actually reached.
Paul v. Pye (1916) 135 Minn. 13, 159 N. W. 1O7O. This class of affidavits is
admitted. Carlson v. Adix (igog) 144 Iowa, 653, 123 N. W. 321, 1912A, Ann.
Cas. 12o4, note. Their admission does not violate the parol evidence rule. Like
the case where a deed by mutual mistake does not conform to the original agree-
ment, the verdict may be corrected. 4 Wigmore, op. cit. sec. 2355. A clerical
error or a mistake of the foreman should not result in a misadministration ofjustice. The majority, in the instant case, regarded the affidavits as belonging
to class one.. The dissenting judge properly placed them in class three, since
they stated in substance that the verdict handed in did not express the true
conclusion of the jury.
MANDAMUS-WRIT TO COMPEL RECOGNITION AS OFFICER OF PRIVATE CoPORA-
TION.-The plaintiff, upon being duly elected to a trusteeship in the defendant
corporation, was refused recognition by the acting board of trustees. To a
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writ of mandamus brought to compel the trustees to accept his election, the
corporation answered that the plaintiff having once been guilty of embezzle-
ment was ineligible as the holder of an office expressly required to be filled by
a person of good moral character. The plaintiff demurred. Held, that the
demurrer should be overruled. Hempstead v. Atchison & Sante F9 Hospital
(1922, Kan.) 21o Pac. 492.
Originally mandamum issued only against public officers but it is now settled
that it will issue to execute a private right in regard to even the internal affairs
of a corporation. See Bailey, Habeas Corpus and Special Remedies (1913)
sec. 299; 26 Cyc. 353. As for example, to enable one to secure a private cor-
porate office to which he has title. State v. Goodwin (1919) 83 W. Va. 25","
98 S. E. 577; Spahn v. Bielefeld (1917) 256 Pa. 543, ioo Atl. 987. Or to effect
the restoration of a member of a private corporation irregularly removed.
Venezia v. Italian Society (19o7) 74 N. J. L. 433, 65 Atl. 898; Miller v. Imperial
Water Co. (19o9) 156 Calif. 27, 103 Pac. 227. But the writ will not issue
against an unincorporated society or association. State v. Cook (1912) 119
Minn. 407, 138 N. W. 432, Ann. Cas. 1914B 88, note; Doyle v. Burke (19o8)
29 R. I. 123, 69 Atl. 362. By the general rule mandamus will immediately issue
to the holder of a clear prima facie title to office, regardless of evidence point-
ing to his ultimate defeat, and the actual validity of his claim will not be deter-
mined in this proceeding. Stevens v. Carter (1895) 27 Or. 553, 40 Pac. 1O74;
It re Williams (908, Sup. Ct.) 57 Misc. 327, 1O7 N. Y. Supp. io5; see L. P_
A. 1915A 833, note; contra: Longyear v. Hardman (1914) 219 Mass. 405, io6
N. E. l12. The reason for this rule lies in the necessity for preserving the
special value of mandamus as a speedy and effectual remedy. See Eldodt v.
Territory (igoo) 1O N. M. 141, 61 Pac. 1O5. But, even so, the writ will be
granted with discretion, and will not issue in support of claims clearly unjust,
although technically regular. Gross v. Baltimore (19o9) iii Md. 543, 75 At.
346; State v. Hare (1916) 7P Or. 540, 153 Pac. 790. In view of the by-laws of
the corporation in the instant case, the plaintiff by demurrer confessed his ineli-
gibility. Had he contested the accusation the court might have refused to try
the merits on the mandamus proceeding, and have granted the writ. For further
discussion of mandamus, see (1922) 31 YALE LA.W JoURNAL, 554; (I918) 3
CoRN. L. QUART. 308; (915) 3 VA. L. REV. 75; (1915) 63 U. PA. L. REV. 575;
Harker, The Use of Mandamus to Compel Educational Institutions to Confer
Degrees (1911) 20 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 341.
PARTNERSHIP-ORAL AGREEMENTS TO DE-AL IN LAND.-The defendant was the
owner of timber land. He entered into a verbal agreement with the plaintiff for
the formation of a partnership for the development and sale of the timber, the
plaintiff to contribute his labor and skill, and the profits to be divided according to
an agreed ratio. Subsequently the defendant refused to carry out the agreement
The plaintiff sued to recover damages for the loss of expected profits. The
defendant demurred, on the ground that the oral agreement involved the transfer
of an interest in land, and was therefore within the Statute of Frauds. Held, that'
the demurrer should be sustained. Edgcomb v. Clough (1922, Pa.) 118 Atl. 61o.
Oral agreements of this type may be either an agreement for a joint ownership
or a true partnership contract In the former it is usually held that if B orally
agrees to purchase land for the joint benefit of himself and A, the transaction
involves the creation of an interest in land and is within the statute of frauds,
in the absence of proof of confidential relationship, fraud, or misrepresentation.
Fischli v. Dunaresly (1820, Ky.) 3 A. K. Marsh, 23; Mancusso v. Rosso (19o8)
81 Neb. 786, 116 N. W. 679. But if A advances a definite proportion of the
purchase money, a resulting trust may be declared in his favor to the extent of
his interest. Seiler v. Mohn (1892) 37 W. Va. 507, 16 S. E. 496; Skehill v.
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Abbott (19o3) 184 Mass. 145, 68 N. E. 37; (1923) 32 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 509
Where, however, a true partnership agreement has been formed to deal in land not
yet acquired the contract is by the weight of authority enforceable, even though
oral. Robhson v. Horer (igi) 176 Ind. 226, 95 N. E. 561; Hardin v. Hardin
(igio) 26 S. D. 6oi, 129 N. W. io8; Buckley v. Doig (1907) 188 N. Y. 238, 8o
N. E. 913; contra: Seymour v. Cushway (1898) 100 Wis. 580, 76 N. W. 769; Raub
v. Simith (1886) 61 Mich. 543, 28 N. W. 676. And even in the courts adopting
the minority view, if the transaction is so far completed that all that remains to be
done is a division of profits, an action will be entertained to recover a propor-
tionate share. Huntington v. Burdean (1912) i4g Wis. 263, 135 N. W. 845;
Bates v. Babcock (1892) 95 Calif. 479, 30 Pac. 605. But where, as in the principal
case, the agreement itself involves a transfer of land from one partner to the firm,
the transaction would clearly seem to be within the statute of frauds. Burgwyn v.
Joles (912) 113 Va. 511, 75 S. E. 188; Pound v. Egbert (1907) 117 App. Div.
756, I02 N. Y. Supp. 1O79. The majority view is sound. A partnership may be
created by parol. i Rowley, Modern Law of Partnership (1916) sec. 212. And
once the relation is established, there seems to be no objection to the acquisition
and sale of land for profit. See Uniform Partnership Act (1914)- secs. 6 (I),
8 (I, 2). Such land is merely a partnership asset, impressed with a trust in favor
of the partners. Miller v. Ferguson (19o7) 1O7 Va. 219, 57 S. E. 649; Stitt v.
Rat Portage Lumber Co. (19o6) 98 Minn. 52, iO7 N. W. 824. And clearly the
partnership agreement does not of itself involve the creation or transfer of any
interest in land. Difficulty in interpreting the transaction usually arises because the
agreement of partnership and the stipulation of dealing in real estate are part of
the same transaction. Where evidence of the former is clear its validity should
not be affected by the nature of the purpose of organization.
PATENTS-INTEREST OF EmPlOYEI IN INvENT ON OF EMpoy.-Under a con-
tract with the defendant's predecessor, the plaintiff developed a process for the
production of automobile springs, installed six such machines, and obtained a
patent thereon. The defendant proceeded to build and install four more of the
machines. In a suit for infringement, the defendant filed a cross-bill claiming
the equitable title to the patent and sought to compel the plaintiff to convey the
legal title. Held, that the cross-bill should be dismissed, since the defendant
had no equitable title. Peck v. Standard Parts Co. (1922, C. C. A. 6th) 282
Fed. 443.
The bare relationship of employer and employee does not ordinarily give the
employer an equitable title to a patent taken out by the employee. Johnson
Furnace Co. v. Western Furnace Co. (igio) io2 C. C. A. 267, 178 Fed. Sig.
But the employer might have a license to use the invention on the ground of
an express or implied contract, or of estoppel. Gill v. United States (I896) i6o
U. S. 426, i6 Sup. Ct 322; Soloinons v. United States (i89o) 137 U. S. 342, 11
Sup. Ct 88. It has been held, however, that the employer has an-equitable title
to the patent, even without an express contract, where one is employed to devise
or perfect a process or machine, because in making the invention the employee
is merely doing what he was hired to do. Wireless Specialty Apparatus Co. v.
Mica Condenser Co. (ig2, Mass.) 131 N. E. 307; (1922) 2 BosT. U. L. REv.
44; (192I) 93 CENT. L. Jotm. 276. This view originated by mere dicta in the
Gill and Solomotts cases, supra. The instant case properly points out that the
character of employment is of weight in suits based on license, whereas it has
no application to those involving equitable title. Macomber, The Fixed Law of
Patents (2d ed. 1913) i6o; Cheever, The Rights of Employer and Employee to
Inventions Made by Either during the Relationship (19o3) i McH. L. REv.
384, 387.
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PLEADING--AMmNDMENT-NEw CAUSE OF AcTioN.-The plaintiff brought a bill
in equity to have a conveyance to the defendant set aside on the ground that
it was obtained by fraudulent misrepresentations. On appeal after judgment
for the plaintiff, the Court of Appeals allowed her to amend her petition to the
effect that the deed was executed while she was under the influence and control
of the defendant. On further appeal to the Supreme Court the defendant con-
tended that the amendment stated a new cause of action, and hence should not
have been allowed. Held, that there was no error. Tinker v. Sauer (1922) 1o5
Ohio St. 135, 136 N. E. 854.
The term "cause of action," used in the codes in several distinct connections,
has been a constant source of difficulty to the courts. NoTES (1922) 22 Cot L.
REv. 61. Notwithstanding some variation in meaning in the different code refer-
ences to it, the idea involved in the phrase seems basically the same wherever
used and should be capable of scientific definition. It has often been used inter-
changeably with right of action. Thus it is said to include the right to prosecute
an action successfully. Schempp v. Davis (1919) 201 Mo. App. 43o, 211 S. W.
728; Travelers" Ins. Co. v. Padula (igi) 224 N. Y. 397, 121 N. E. 348. It would
seem, however, properly to refer only to the operative facts which give rise to
the right. Phillips, Code Pleading (1896) 27, 28, criticising Pomeroy, Code
Pleading, 453, 519; cf. Sibley, The Right to and The Cause for Action
(19o2). Hence the remedy is a consequence of, and no part of the cause of
action. Felt City Townsite Co. v. Investment Co. (1917) 5o Utah, 364, 167 Pac.
835; Vaughn v. St. Louis & S. F. Ry. (1914) 177 Mo. App. 155, 164 S. W. 144.
It has been said to consist of every fact which the plaintiff must prove to get
judgment Furnace Co. v. Scranton Coal Co. (I92O, C. C. A. 3d.) 266 Fed. 798.
And of only the defendant's wrongful act. Sibley, op. cit. 24-30. It has been
defined as the violation of a primary right-apparently meaning principal right.
(192o) 29 YALE LAW JoURNAL, 685; Burgett, When Does an Amendment Intro-
duce a New Cause of Action (19o8) 40 CHrc. LEG. NEWS, 219; cf. Rowland Co.
v. Kell Co. (1922, Ga.) 107 S. E. 602. This definition seems open to criticism
for ambiguity in the term primary, which also offers no clue as to its content in
specific cases. The modern tendency to permit amendments changing the legal
theory of recovery-amendments "from law to law"--indicates that the cause is
not the same as the remedial right. See (1922) 32 YALE LAW JOURNAL, i9g;
(1920) 29 ibid. 685; COMMENTS (1919) 28 ibid. 693; (1918) 27 ibid. 1053;
Albertsworth, The Theory of the Pleadings in Code States (1922) lo CAI". L.
REV. 202. Injuries to both person and property inflicted at the same time are
by the majority view held to constitute but one cause of action, although clearly
more than a single primary right is involved. Jenkins v. Skelton (1920) 21
Ariz. 663, 192 Pac. 249; Anderson v. Jacobson (1919) 42 N. D. 87, 172 N. W.
64; (1922) 32 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 190. The cause of action seems therefore
to refer to the entire series of facts out of which a right to remedial relief
through the courts arises. To determine whether a new cause of action is
stated will therefore involve a comparison of the operative facts originally stated
with those now stated, to determine whether they are in any large measure
dissimilar. The conclusion of the instant case is proper. For a similar result
permitting at the trial an amendment of a claim for money obtained by undue
influence to a claim for the money as a loan, although the defendant had died
in the meantime and no claim had been presented against her estate, see Raymond
v. Bailey (1922, Conn.) ii8 Atl. 915. It may even be questioned whether the
power of amendment should be restricted to the stating of the same cause of
action except in cases where the statute of limitations has intervened, and in
cases similar to the instant case where the amendment is offered to an appellate
tribunal.
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PuBurc UTmTIs--RATE-MAXING---GOING CoNcERN VALuE.-The plaintiff street
railway company secured a temporary injunction against the enforcement of an
ordinance restricting it to a five-cent fare on its lines, and the court appointed
a master to make advisory findings as to whether the rate was confiscatory. In
fixing the base value the master made allowance for value as a going concern
and computed it by capitalizing past deficits. He found that the rates were not
confiscatory, and the injunction was dissolved. The plaintiff appealed. Held,
that good will and going concern value are important in determining whether
a rate is reasonable, but are to be excluded in determining whether it is confisca-
tory; in any event they are not to be computed by capitalizing past deficits.
Galveston Elec. Ry. v. Galveston (1922, U. S.) 42 Sup. Ct. 351.
A slightly later case on the same facts held that going value, being dependent
on the financial history of the utility, should not be allowed. Houston v. S. W.
Bell Tel. Co. (1922, U. S.) 42 Sup. Ct. 486. Going concern value is the value
which attaches to a utility because its business is established, as distinguished
from one in a static state. Des Moines Gas Co. v. Des Moines (1915) 238 U. S.
153, 35 Sup. Ct. 811. Because of the element of monopoly, in public utilities it
includes only the actual cost of putting the utility on a paying basis, and not
good will. Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co. (1909) 212 U. S. I, 29 Sup. Ct.
192; 2 Wyman, Public Service Corporations (2d ed. 1911) sec. 11o2; COMMENTS
(1917) 27 YALE LA, w JoURN AL, 386. The usual rule is that going value is a
property interest and should be considered in fixing base value, on proof of the
investment necessary to organize and establish the business. Lincoln Gas &
Elec. Co. v. Lincoln (1918) 250 U. S. 256, 39 Sup. Ct. 454; Re Interstate Water
Co. [1922 E] Pub. Util. Rep. (ILL.) 246; Re Huntington Water Corp. [1922 C]
Pub. Util. Rep. (W. Va.) 636. The item of going concern value does not arise
under the prudent investment theory. The test applied by the instant case is not
clear. See COMMENTS (1922) 32 YALE LAW JouRNAL., 390; NOTES AND COMMENTS
(1922) I TEx. L. REv. 89. Several methods have been employed in computing
the amount to be allowed. Hardman, Going Value as Value for Purposes of
Rate Rfgulation (1917) 25 W. VA. L. QUART. 89. The principal case repudi-
ates the Wisconsin rule of capitalizing past deficits, which has found little
support. Hill v. Antigo Water Co. (1909) 3 Wis. Ry. Cas. 623; Re Clayton-
Glassboro Water Co. [1922 E] Pub. Util. Rep. (N. J.) 223; Trustees v. Western
N. Y. Util. Co. [1922 E] Pub. Util. Rep. (N. Y.) 119; Ga. Ry. & P. Co. Zo.
Comm. (1922, N. D. Ga.) 278 Fed. 242. The injustice of this rule appears
when courts refuse to allow going value because the utility's excessive earnings
have been sufficient to offset past deficits, thus permitting capital value to be
wiped out by subsequent earnings. It re Clarksburg Co. [1917 A] Pub. Util.
Rep. (W. Va.) 577; San Joaquin L. & P. Corp. v. Comm. (1917) 175 Calif. 74,
165 Pac. 16; Hardman, loc cit. The ordinary method of computing this interest
is.to add an indefinite "something" to the value of many of the items constituting
the plant, and not to make a separate allowance. Des Moines Gas Co. v. Des
Moines, supra; Ip re W. Va. Tract. & Elec. Co. (1917) W. Va. Pub. Serv. Cas.
No. 568. It seems that a more workable method would be through a comparison
of the estimated net earnings of a hypothetical plant and of the actual plant
during the period necessary to bring the earnings of the hypothetical plant up
to those of the actual plant; the present worth of the difference representing
the going value.
QUAsI-CONTRACT-MIsTAxE-SERicES RENDERED BY WOMAN BELMVNG HER-
SEL? TO BE MIARmuuD.-The plaintiff was induced into marital relationship by
means of false representations. It was not until the decease of her paramour
that she first learned that the marriage was void. She brought this action against
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the administratrix of the estate of the deceased for the value of her personal
services and for the rental value of her house in which both she and the deceased
had lived. Held, (two judges dissenting) that the plaintiff could recover. In re
Fox's Estate (1922, Wis.) 190 N. W. go.
The authorities appear to be unanimous in holding that a woman deceived
into a void marriage with a man already married may maintain an action
against him for deceit Morrill v. Palmer (1895) 68 Vt. I, 33 Atl. 829; 33
L. R. A. 411, note. But in the absence of statute the action for deceit does
not survive against the personal representative. Grim v. Carr's Administrators
(1858) 31 Pa. 533; PTice v. Price (1878) 75 N. Y. 244. The courts, however,
are in conflict as to whether an action in quasi-contract can be maintained for
services rendered credente sese uxorem. No case has been found where such an
action was brought during the lifetime of the wrongdoer. In Massachusetts
the rule is well settled that the plaintiff's only remedy is an action of tort for
deceit, a cause of action which does not survive. Cooper v. Cooper (i888) 147
Mass. 370, 17 N. E. 892. In Connecticut it seems that an action in quasi-contract
is allowed only if the deceased acquired specific property which increased the
assets in the hands of his personal representative. Payne's Appeal (1895) 65
Conn. 397, 32 AtL 948; Keener, Quasi Contracts (1893) 323. Several jurisdic-
tions have allowed a quasi-contractual recovery for the rendition of services.
Fox v. Dawson's Curator (I82o, La.) 8 Mart. (o. s.) 94; Higgins v. Breen
(1845) 9 MO. 293; Sanders v. Ragan (igi6) 172 N. C. 612, 90 S. E. 777. In
such a case the proper measure of recovery should be the reasonable value of
the benefits given in excess of the benefits received. Sanders v. Ragan, supra;
Woodward, Quasi Contracts (1913) 296. No distinction should be made between
receipt of money and receipt of services or other benefits. The decision in the
instant case is in accord with the better reasoned opinions and arrives at the
more equitable result. See (1923) 9 VA. L. REv. 313; (1923) 23 COL. L. REv. 19o.
SAI ES-ElECrioN OF REMEDIES BY THE SELLER AFTER ANTICIPATORY BREACH.-
After partial performance of a contract for the sale of automobile, tires to be
manufactured, the buyer refused to accept and pay for the remainder. The
seller sued for damages. Held, (two judges dissenting) that the plaintiff
could not recover, since sec. 146 of the Personal Property Law, N. Y. Laws,
1911, ch. 571 (Uniform Sales Act, sec. 65) makes it mandatory to give notice
of the seller's "election to rescind" as a prerequisite to a suit for damages for
the breach. Henderson Tire & Rubber Co. v. Wilson (1922, App. Div.) 196
N. Y. Supp. 879.
In cases of anticipatory breach the plaintiff may elect one of three remedies:
first, he may rescind and recover on quantum ineruit for the part already per-
formed; second, he need not avail himself of the anticipatory breach but may
sue on the contract at the time set for performance; third, he may treat the
repudiation as putting an end to the contract and sue for damages for the breach.
United Press v. Newspaper Ass'n. (igi6, C. C. A. 8th) 237 Fed. 547; Stoneking
v. Long (igo8) 142 111. App. 2o3; Indiana Life Endownent Co. v. Carnithan
(igi6) 62 Ind. App. 567, 1O9 N. E. 851; Tipple v. Tipple (igig) 189 App. Div.
28, 177 N Y. Supp. 813. The common-law rules of anticipatory breach apply
with equal force to sales contracts. Uniform Sales Act, secs. 64, 65; Texas
Seed & Floral Co. v. Chicago Set & Seed Co. (1916, Tex. Civ. App.) 187
S. W. 747; Churchill Grain Co. v. Newton (1914) 88 Conn. 130, 89 At. 1121
(applying sec. 64). By "rescission" both parties are completely released and
restored as nearly as possible to the status quo, and all rights under the contract
are extinguished. Jones v. McGinn (1914) 70 Or. 236, 240, 14o Pac. 994, 996;
Reiger v. Turley (1911) 151 Iowa, 491, 501, 131 N. W. 866, 869. A suit for
damages precludes the existence of rescission. Anvil Mining Co. v. Humble
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(1894) 153 U. S. 540, 541, 14 Sup. Ct. 876, 88o. The Court in the instant case mis-
construed the meaning and effect of "rescission," both under and before the Act.
See Modern Hat Works v. Liberal Trading Co. (1917, Sup. Ct.) 164 N. Y. Supp.
622, 623; Wester v. Casein Co. (1912) 206 N. Y. 5o6, 515, loO N. E. 488, 491.
As a result it applied the wrong section of the Sales Act, thereby denying the
plaintiff damages to which he was entitled. The dissenting opinion is correct in
insisting that sec. 146 has no application to the facts of this case.
TRusTs-STATura OF FEAUDS-PAROL TRUST OF LAND.-A promised B, his
nephew and business manager, $io,ooo if B refrained from using intoxicating
liquor for five years. After B had abstained for two years, A offered to buy
any house B might select, instead of paying B $io,ooo at the end of five years.
A purchased such a house, taking title in his own name, and stating that he was
buying for B. Possession was immediately delivered to B at A's direction. A
always referred to B as owner, but never delivered a deed. After A's death his
heirs claimed the house. Held, (one judge dissenting) that there was a valid
trust. Greensboro Bk. & Trust Co. v. Scott (1922, N. C.) 114 S. E. 475.
The seventh section of the English Statute of Frauds has never been adopted
in North Carolina, and it is well settled in that state that though one already
owning land may not declare himself trustee orally, nevertheless one who intends
to become.holder of the legal title may validly agree by parol to hold it in trust.
Lefkowitz v. Silver (1921) 182 N. C. 339, 1O9 S. E. 56; Wilson v. Jones (1918) 176
N. C. 2o5, 97 S. E. 18. In most jurisdictions, however, the statute of frauds
would be an obstacle to the creation of an express oral trust in land. Bogert
Trusts (1921) 54. There are partial analogies to sustain the.instant case even
in those jurisdictions. Where A buys land, taking title in B's name, it is well
settled that a resulting trust is created in favor of A to which the statute of
frauds does not apply. Bogert, op. cit. 95. The majority of the court in the
instant case suggest that the transaction really amounted to. a purchase by A
with B's money, since B released A from his promise to pay $ioooo after five
years. This clearly would be true if the purchase were made after the five year
period had passed and B had duly performed; or if A had loaned the purchase
money to B and had taken title in himself as security. Scott v. Beach (1898) 172
Ill. 273, 5o N. E. 196. But such a result may be questioned here since at the
time of the purchase B's performance still had three years to run. By the
weight of authority in this country, delivery of possession to a vendee under a
parol contract for the sale of land is sufficient part performance to take the
contract out of the statute of frauds; the possession must be with the vendor's
consent and in pursuance of the contract. Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (4th
ed. 1919) sec. 2241. By analogy the same rule should be applicable to express
oral trusts of land where there has been sufficient part execution of a similar
character. Particularly should this be so, where the trust is sought to be
created only to enforce what in effect amounts to an oral sale of the land.
Browne, Statute of Frauds (5th ed. 1895) sec. 113; see Harman v. Fisher (1912)
.go Neb. 688, 134 N. W. 246; Scott, Cases on Trusts (1919) 193, note i. The
result, however, would not be reached on this ground in North Carolina, since
that state rejects the whole doctrine of part performance in transfers of realty.
Ames, Cases in Equity Jurisdiction (19o4) 289, note 2; Pomeroy, op. cit. sec.
2245; I N. C. L. REV. 48.
